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GREGOR SClllEMANN 
INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND DISCOVERY. ON HANS 
REICHENBACH'S FOUNDATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Hans Reichenbach's distinction between a context of discovery and a context of 
justification continues to be relevant all the way up to the present. This can be seen 
clearly in the tense relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. In 
the current debates ab out the relationships between these two disciplines one encoun-
ters arguments that Reichenbach used to defend this distinction, as weIl as arguments 
brought forth by his critics.1 Sometimes the discussions even refer directly to the 
influence ofReichenbach's distinction (Giere 1999, pp. 11-18 and 217-230). 
Historically, this influence can be understood to have gone hand in hand with the 
significance of 10gical empiricism in the twentieth century for the development of 
philosophy of science and science studies, i.e., history, sociology and psychology of 
science. Reichenbach used the distinction in 1938 in his "Experience and Prediction", 
which played a key role in the new beginning oflogical empiricism in the USo Among 
the many motives that might have led Reichenbach to formulate this distinction, his 
intention to contribute to the foundation of the autonomy of a "scientific philoso-
phy" presumably had central importance.2 In this context, its function was to clarify 
Reichenbach's stance towards other philosophical trends, to prove the homogeneity 
ofthe methodology and content ofphilosophy ofscience, and to distance philosophy 
of science from riyal disciplines. Reichenbach 's remarks suggest-and I shall return 
to this point-that "context of discovery" means above all a part of the research 
conducted in the natural sciences. One of the messages that Reichenbach wanted to 
communicate with his distinction was: the "scientific philosophy" of logical empiri-
cism can provide a justification for the theories brought forth in the natural sciences, 
whereas the natural sciences themselves are not in a position to do so. 
Since the "historical turn" accompanying Thomas S. Kuhn 's "The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions", the distinction of contexts has been increasingly influential in dis-
tinguishing among the philosophy of science and the disciplines of science studies-
in particular to the relationship between the philosophy and the history of science. To 
put it simply, from the perspective of analytical philosophy of science-into which 
the tradition of logical empiricism passed over-the historical presentation of the 
natural sciences now stands alongside the natural sciences, which are themselves the 
province of the context of discovery. 
I do not want to go into the details of the debates about the justification of dis-
ciplinary boundaries and relationships between the history and the philosophy of 
science. Rather, I would like to assume that Reichenbach's distinction lives on, and 
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to seek arguments in his texts that would justify their relevance in this field. The 
persuasive force of these arguments transcends the contingent circumstances apart 
from which their genesis and local transmission cannot be made understandable. 
These arguments have not yet been sufficiently acknowledged in the expansive 
secondary literature dealing with the context distinction-which might not be a small 
matter, considering their current infiuence. My thesis is that, for Reichenbach, the 
context distinction unfolds its relevance for the formation of disciplines in relation to 
the theory of induction. This connection has until now only seldom been mentioned.3 
This is all the more astounding considering that most of the few passages where 
Reichenbach employed the distinction subsequent to1935 make direct reference to 
induction (Reichenbach 1935a, pp. 172-173; Reichenbach 1938, pp. 6-7 and 381-
382; Reichenbach 1944, p. 80; Reichenbach 1947, p. 2; Reichenbach 1949a, pp. 433-
434; Reichenbach 1949b, pp. 291-293; Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). Since induction 
plays a key role for Reichenbach in the natural sciences as weH in epistemology, 
he is confronted with the question of the autonomy of epistemology. How does the 
application of and the thinking about induction differ between epistemology and the 
natural sciences? Are the differences gradual or categorical in nature? 
Reichenbach 's conclusive answer goes back to the pragmatic justification of induc-
tion that he developed in 1933. This justification emphasizes the normative character 
of epistemology in contrast to the disciplines that study science in a more descriptive 
manner. I am not interested in attempting a new defence ofthis justification-which is 
still controversial today-but in highlighting its role in establishing a discipline 's spe-
cific claim to rationality.4 The plausible elements ofthis function come to light if one 
looks beyond Reichenbach's exaggerated fixation on logical analysis. They provide 
positive points of reference that can be used today in understanding the relationship 
between the philosophy and the history of science. 
My presentation of the connection between the context distinction and induction 
takes into account only the version ofthe distinction-among the many in Reichen-
bach's work (Schiemann 2003; Hoyningen-Huene, this volume)-that relates to its 
function of contributing to the distinction between the tasks and practices of epis-
temology and those of other disciplines-which is probably its historically relevant 
function. 5 I can only mention here that this version-as weH as the others-goes back 
to a traditional distinction between genesis and validity that reaches back to Kant 
(Schiemann 2003; Stadler 2002). 
I shaH begin by characterizing the context distinction as employed by Reichenbach 
in "Experience and Prediction" to differentiate between epistemology and science 
(1). FoHowing Thomas Nickles and Kevin T. KeHy, {>ne can distinguish two meanings 
ofthe context distinction in Reichenbach's work. One meaning, which is primarily 
to be found in the earlier writings, conceives of scientific discoveries as potential 
objects of epistemologicaljustification. The other meaning, typical for the later writ-
ings, removes scientific discoveries from the possible domain of epistemology. The 
genesis of both meanings, which demonstrates the complexity of the relationships 
obtaining between epistemology and science, can be made understandable by appeal-
ing to the historical context (2). Both meanings present Reichenbach with the task 
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of establishing the autonomy of epistemology through the justification of induction. 
Finally, I shall expound this justification and address some of its elements of rationality 
characterizing philosophy of science (3). 
1. 
Since the connection between the context distinction and induction is already made 
dear in his presentation in section 1 of "Experience and Prediction", and since 
Reichenbach provides here a relevant basis for subsequent reflections, I will go into 
some detail about this passage. Reichenbach speaks in section I of three tasks that 
are typical for epistemology in contrast to other disciplines: the "descriptive", the 
"critical" and the "advisory" task. 
The Descriptive Task 
The descriptive task consists in the "rational reconstruction" of scientific "thought 
processes". (By "science" Reichenbach means here and indeed for the most part 
natural science.) The concept of"rational reconstruction" is borrowed from Rudolf 
Carnap (Carnap 1928). It characterizes the normative task of epistemology: "to con-
struct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur if they are to be 
ranged in a consistent system" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 5). Any logical connections 
missing between the "starting point and issue" of areal thought process are pro-
duced in such a way that the postulate of greatest posslble correspondence is fulfilled 
(Reichenbach 1938, p. 5). This postulate has to presuppose that real scientific pro-
cesses have something at least approximating a logical content. In order to characterize 
the relative difference between the reconstruction and its object, Reichenbach intro-
duces his context distinction. He does justice to the relativity of this difference by 
defining rational reconstruction by analogy to scientific practice: 
"If a more convenient determination of this concept of rational reconstruction is wanted, we might say 
that it corresponds to the form in wbich thinking processes are communicated to other persons instead 
ofthe form in wbich they are subjectively performed. [ ... The] well-known difference between the 
thinker's way of finding [ ... a] theorem and bis way of presenting it before a public rnay illustrate 
the difference in question. I shall introduce the terms context 01 discovery and context oljustification 
to mark this distinetion. Then we have to say that epistemology is only occupied in constructing the 
context of justification. But even the way of presenting scientific theories is only an approximation to 
what we mean by the context of justification" (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 6-5--emphasis in original). 
Thus, the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification is intended 
initially to mark a distinction within scientific practice. Scientific knowledge, accord-
ing to Reichenbach, is often presented in a form different from that in which it was 
found. (Following Reichenbach, one could speak of an "inner-scientific" distinction 
of contexts.) The demarcation of the descriptive task of epistemology from science 
is a further step beyond this initial distinction. Epistemology differs from science in 
that its domain is limited to the context of justification, which exists to some extent 
also within science. 
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Reichenbach does not offer any reason why scientists could not in principle re-
construct their theories themselves. He notes only two factors that prevent scientific 
presentations from meeting the demands of logic. First, there are "the traces of sub-
jective motivation from which [ ... the scientific expositions] started" (Reichenbach 
1938, p. 7). Secondly, "scientific language, being destined like the language of daily 
life for practical purposes, contains so many abbreviations and silently tolerated in-
exactitudes" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 7). But these explanations raise more questions 
than they answer. Why should "subjective motives" and "practical goals" lead to 
non-logical elements in the presentation of theories? Can these factors also infiu-
ence logic and epistemology? What stands in the way of eliminating non-logical 
elements in the sciences--given that they are present-to a degree that satisfies 
logicians?6 
Critical Task 
Until the initially vague demarcation is sharpened, there can be no foundation of the 
autonomy of epistemology. This is achieved in part by reference to the following 
two tasks. In its critical task, epistemology is no longer bound to the postulate of 
greatest possible correspondence. Reichenbach assumes now that the logical content 
of scientific thinking is so defective that a rational reconstruction cannot achieve 
a logically consistent structure. The "analysis of science" must therefore replace 
reconstruction. 
We "replace actual thinking by such operations as are justifiable, that is, as can be demonstrated as 
valid" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 7). 
But the analysis of science remains bound to the "starting point and issue" of 
real thought processes. Within this general condition the inductivist conception of 
science emerges, which Reichenbach was to deve10p further in the course of the 
book. This conception regards relations among data as the starting point and scientific 
theories-which reproduce and inductive1y genera1ize these relations by applying 
mathematical functions to them-as the issue of scientific thought processes. The 
goal of epistemology-as set out in chapter 5 of "Experience and Prediction"-is 
a formal demonstration of the va1idity of the inductive relations between data and 
theories. In pursuing this goal, the analysis of science can rely on structures that 
already exist-however incomplete1y formulated-in scientific presentations. Indeed, 
Reichenbach propounds the ''thesis that all inferences occurring [in science] are ofthe 
inductive type" (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 370-371). The analysis ofscience endeavors 
to explicate the 10gica1 form ofthis inductive structure by reso1ving it into a structure 
of deductive relations, leaving the rule of induction as the only non-deductive relation 
(Reichenbach 1949a, p. 471). He understands the ru1e of induction-to choose one 
ofhis many formulations-as "the assumption that an event which occurred n times 
will occur at all following times" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 341). I shou1d like mere1y 
to note at this stage that the justification of this rule would exceed the scope of an 
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epistemology characterized by the two tasks I have addresses thus far. As David Hume 
showed, the rule cannot be logically proven. Its justification-if at all possible -
demands that one abandon the field of logical analysis, which is the third task of 
epistemology licenses. 
Advisory Task 
In perfonning its advisory task, epistemology meets science as an independent dis-
cipline with positive suggestions. This is necessary, as Reichenbach sees it, because 
the analysis of science may be an indispensable tool for making correct decisions 
between different modes of presentation and different directions in which science 
might be developed. 
With respect to different modes of presentation, Reichenbach only speaks of the 
choice between "equivalent conceptions" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 9), i.e., theories that 
he considers logically equivalent because they agree in all observable facts (Reichen-
bach 1938, p. 374; Reichenbach 1951, p. 180). One could mention at this point also 
the case of the non-equivalent theories Reichenbach discusses in chapter 5, which 
differ in their prognoses and therefore present a problem of making a choice too 
(Reichenbach 1938, pp. 375-376). Unfortunately, Reichenbach offers no precise char-
acterization of these two types of relationship between theories. It remains unclear 
just how broadly he construes the concept of logical equivalence. Strictly speaking, 
logical equivalence is only derived from empirical equivalence when all theoretical 
concepts are defined by observational concepts (Friedman 1983, p. 280; Klein 2000, 
p. 85). In any case, it is clear that for Reichenbach only logical analysis can deter-
mine whether theories are equivalent or non-equivalent. In the case of equivalent 
theories, science can be relied upon to choose between them on the basis of mere 
expediency. As for non-equivalent theories, on the other hand, Reichenbach believes 
that his theory of induction provides the framework in which adecision can be made 
(Reichenbach 1938, pp. 375-379). Hence, epistemology could exercise an important 
infiuence in the presentation of scientific theories. Apparently Reichenbach does not 
take into account (at least not in the context of "Experience and Prediction") the 
empirical underdetermination of scientific theories, as formulated by Pierre Duhem. 
Underdetennined theories may have the property ofbeing logically incompatible and 
thus elude the competency of an analysis of science. If Reichenbach had taken this 
property into consideration, he could only have maintained the role of epistemology 
in examining and choosing between theories by abandoning his limitation to logi-
cal analysis and-like Neurath, for example-admitting values as a philosophical 
topic.7 
That this would not have been wholly out of the question is demonstrated by his 
ideas about "volitional bifurcations" which concem the direction in which science 
might be developed. Choices about the aims of research count as such bifurcations 
(Reichenbach 1938, pp. 10-11). Although Reichenbach does not mention it at this 
stage,justification ofthe rule of induction would also have to be included here, since it 
depends on the specific aim of predicting the future. Moreover, fundamental concepts 
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of a philosophy of science-i.e., causality and probability--<:an be traced back to 
volitional bifurcations (Reichenbach 1938, p. 11). 
Reichenbach does make the claim that the advisory task could be reduced to the 
critical task if epistemology is restricted to "constru[ing] a list of all possible decisions, 
each one accompanied by its entailed decisions [ ... and] leav[ing] the choice to our 
reader" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 14). But in the course of the book he does not justify his 
assertion that epistemology itself is free from volitional bifurcations. In subsequent 
chapters he makes decisions about the fundamental concepts of philosophy of science 
and logical presentation without displaying the alternatives neutrally to the reader. 8 
If one traces the relationship between epistemology and science step-by-step through 
the delineation ofthe three tasks, one arrives at a paradoxical conclusion. On the one 
hand, the distance between the two disciplines increases successively from the initial 
postulate of maximal correspondence to the merely formal relationship of inductive 
structure, and finally to the stage at which epistemology fulfils its advisory task as an 
independent discipline. But there is also a sense in which the distinction between the 
two disciplines becomes increasingly problematic. When Reichenbach asserts that 
the formal structure of scientific reasoning is essentially inductive and knowledge 
thereof is decisive in examining and choosing theories, the question presents itself to 
the reader: why should science have to yield the task of analyzing this structure to 
another discipline at all? 
Epistemology, in Reichenbach's view, differs from science in that it is limited to 
the context of justification and focuses on its logical presentation. But the inductive 
structure of logical presentation refers to the question of discovery. Reichenbach 
conceives of"the aim of induction" as finding "the laws of nature in their most general 
form, including both statistical and so-calledcausallaws" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 350). 
If real processes of discovery until now have not followed the inductive method, could 
epistemology develop an alternative logic of discovery? Reichenbach seems however 
to suspect that there are also rational elements already in real processes of discovery. 
In bis critique of Karl Poppers 's "Logik der Forschung" in 1935, he states that "the 
process of constructing scientific hypotheses ought to be rationalized" (Reichenbach 
1935b, p. 281). Can the thought processes involved in discovery be at least partially 
grasped through inductive logic? These questions show that the theory of induction 
plays a decisive role in the characterization of the context distinction as a criterion 
for distinguishing the two disciplines. 
2. 
Reichenbach gives no clear answer to these questions. In fact, his views on the context 
distinction were subject to vacillations over the years that cannot neatly be assigned 
to specific time periods. One can however tentatively distinguish two phases in which 
he emphasizes different aspects of its meaning (Nickles 1990, p. 158; Kelly 1991, 
pp. 137-139). In an early phase he places weight on the rationalization ofprocesses 
of discovery as a matter for epistemology, whereas in a later phase he is inclined to 
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doubt that this rationalization is possible and eliminates it from the epistemological 
context of justification. 
The Early Phase: Rationalizing Discovery 
The last two paragraphs of "Experience and Prediction" belong to the early phase. 
Here the distinction of contexts does not prevent scientific discoveries from following 
the inductive method too. 
"Ifwe were to analyze the discoveries of[ ... scientists], we would find that their way ofproceeding 
corresponds in a surprisingly high degree to the rules ofthe principle of induction [ ... ]. The mysticism 
of scientific discovery is nothing but a superstructure of images and wishes; the supporting structure 
below is determined by the inductive principle. [ ... !t] seems to be a psychologicallaw that discoveries 
need a kind of mythology [, ... ] that sometimes those men will be best in making inductioDS who 
believe they posses other guides" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 403) (Reichenbach uses the term "principle 
ofinduction" here and elsewhere synonymously with "rule ofinduction".) 
The context distinction assumes the shape of a distinction formulated in 
Marxist terminology between super- and supporting structure.9 The inductive sup-
porting structure is susceptible of justification, whereas the mythology of the 
superstructure-i.e., "instinctive presentiments" and "belief in a mystic harmony 
between nature and reason" (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 403-404), but also "belief in 
induction, belief in a uniformity ofthe world" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 403)-is not. 
These notions, which for whatever inexplicable reasons are necessary for the appli-
cation of induction in the sciences, could only be left to psychology to investigate. 
Within the framework provided by this conception, the history of science-which 
Reichenbach does not address-would deal with the superstructure as weIl as the 
supporting structure (cf. Salmon 1970). 
As much as these and other formulations in the last two paragraphs of"Experience 
and Prediction" seem to place Reichenbach in proximity to a "logic of discovery" 
(Nickles 1980; eurd 1980; Laudan 1980), a close reading reveals that he does not 
go beyond general statements like those in the passage quoted above. In none of the 
examples he mentions does he claim that natural scientists "find" theories by applying 
an inductive method.1o It always remains an open question how the scientists arrive 
at their theories. It may be that they are guided by inductive considerations, but as for 
this question, Reichenbach says merely: "we do not maintain anything" (Reichenbach 
1938, p. 382). He does not question the distinction between supporting structure and 
superstructure. 
At the same time, it stands firm in "Experience and Prediction" that theory gen-
eration in the sciences may in principle proceed inductively, and that the context of 
discovery belongs among the possible objects of an analysis of science. 11 Against 
this background, Reichenbach must have been uncertain whether it might have been 
better to advise scientists to employ the inductive method in their pursuit of dis-
covery instead of abandoning themselves to mythology. His ambivalent stance is 
refiected in the rhetoric with which he invests the distinction of contexts in the penul-
timate paragraph. On the one hand, he disparages scientists by suggesting that they 
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1949b, p. 293). Though the relationship between discovery and justification in the 
sciences may be complex, the tasks of epistemology remain henceforth limited to 
the context ofjustification. Epistemology has no pretensions ab out reconstructing the 
context of discovery. 
The Historical Context 0/ the Discussion o/Induction 
Although I do not want to over-emphasize the vacillations in Reichenbach 's conception 
ofthe context distinction, I would like to have a closer look at its historical context-
including its establishment through the justification of induction. The vacillations 
can be attributed to uncertainties that are understandable in light of the consider-
able difficulties faced by the logical empiricists as they re-settled to the US in the 
1930s. 
According to Ronald N. Giere, philosophy in German in the opening decades of the 
twentieth century was shaped by a "Kantian framework", whereas the "philosophical 
climate" of the US was dominated by the traditions of Empiricism and Pragmatism 
(Giere 1999, p. 225). Giere invokes this difference to explain the fact that probability 
and induction, which had "not played a significant role" for the logical empiricists 
before their relocation, became "major topics in the philosophy of science." Indeed, 
although Reichenbach had occupied himself as early as 1916--in his dissertation-
with the theory of probability, it was not until he left Berlin that he began actively 
publishing work on the induction problem. 16 From that point on, induction was to 
remain in the foreground-not only in "Experience and Prediction" but also in the 
English edition of the "Theory of Probability." 
In the US, induction was an ideal area for Reichenbach to establish hirnself with 
a contribution. 17 With his justification of the rule of induction, he succeeded. He 
himselfbelieved that he had no less than "finally arrived at a solution to the induction 
problem", which had stood "as the unsolved riddle before all empiricist philosophy 
since the time ofHume" (Letter of June 3, 1935 to Ernst von Aster, quoted in Karnlah 
1994, p. 533). In "Experience and Prediction" and in the English edition of the 
"Theory of Probability", the justification of the role of induction assumes central 
importance. 
Reichenbach intended to show with the context distinction that the logical analysis 
of induction and the justification of induction he had proposed are among the tasks 
that belong exclusively within the province of epistemology. At the same time, only 
after justifying the role of induction could Reichenbach demonstrate that logical 
analysis avails itself exclusively of justified laws and thereby establish the distinction 
between contexts of discovery and justification. Justification of the laws of deduction 
is unproblematic, since they "always lead to true sentences if the premises are true. 
[ ... But for] the rule of induction such a proof is not possible" (Reichenbach 1949a, 
p. 471). In the absence of a justification of the role of induction, there can be no 
response to the Humean argument that one assumes the validity of induction out 
of habit. Induction would belong alongside the non-rational elements of discovery 
among the objects that can only be analyzed by psychology. Thus neither the earlier 
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interpretation ofthe context distinction nor the later one can be maintained without a 
justification of the rule of induction. 
3. 
In order to distinguish Reichenbach's justification of the rule of induction from a 
"validation", Herbert Feigl characterized it as a "vindication". Rules are validated 
when they are derived from a fundamental principle. When this is impossible-as 
in the case of the rule of induction-their use can be vindicated by defending its 
appropriateness for a given purpose (Feigl 1950). I would like to add that a role 
which has been justified in this manner can be regarded as rational in an instrumen-
tal sense, since the appropriateness of its application is established only as a means 
to a given goal. A more broadly construed concept of rationality could surely en-
compass the well-founded choice of goals. But this would not accurately represent 
Reichenbach's procedure, since he gives no reasons for his choice ofthe airn ofthe 
scientific method, namely "ofpredicting the future" (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 474, or 
Reichenbach 1938, pp. 349-350). Moreover, he does not address alternatives to this 
resolution-like Goethe's decision to limit his scientific research to the description 
of nature, or the atomistic program of explaining nature, to mention just two of the 
historically most significant examples-although such a discussion would be possible 
within the framework ofthe advisory task of epistemology (see part 2 above). 
The decision in favor of prognosis determines Reichenbach's formulation of the 
rule of induction, i.e., ''that an event which occurred n times will occur at all following 
times" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 341; see above). He believes that a defense of induction 
can only succeed within the framework of his theory of probability. The core of his 
argumentation can however be understood independently of the specific probabilistic 
interpretation with which he invests it. It corresponds to the structure ofBlaise Pascal 's 
famous wager, according to which one must decide in favor ofbelief in the existence 
of God, since this is the only way one might-if God indeed exists-attain truth and 
salvation. 18 
Like Pascal, Reichenbach assumes two possible states ofthe world and two possible 
courses of action. For Reichenbach, the world can be either uniform or non-uniform. 
Insofar as he does not think it possible to know the actual state of the world, he shares 
Hume 's scepticism. The possible courses of action-given independently of the state 
ofthe world---can be divided disjunctively into the inductive and the non-inductive. 
This scheme yields four possible states: 
I. The application of the inductive method leads in the long run to certain success in 
the uniform world. 
2. In the non-uniform world its successes are merely coincidental, thUS its success is 
on the whole uncertain. 
3. Uncertainty of prognostic success is also characteristic of the state of the non-
uniform world when the inductive method is not employed, i.e., when either no 
methodology or non-inductive methods such as clairvoyance are used. 
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4. But it in fact makes a difference in the uniform world which ofthese non-inductive 
variants one chooses. 0nly the absence of any methodology at all would in general 
be unsuccessful. The possible success of a non-inductive method, however, could 
only be assessed in comparison to the results of the inductive method. There can 
be no guarantee of prognostic success in the uniform world when induction is not 
employed. 19 
Given Reichenbach's suppositions, induction is the surest procedure for attaining 
successful prognoses-when success is possible. The first state is the only rational 
one. The vindication has a pragmatic character, since-and herein lies another re-
semblance to Pascal 's wager-it does not defend belief in the success of actions but 
the rationality of a procedure for choosing actions.20 "Actions directed by the rule 
ofinduction are legitimate attempts at success; no form of belief is required for the 
proof" (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 481). Hence, belief in the success of induction is 
just as mythica1 in nature as belief in the success of non-inductive procedures in the 
sciences. 
The validity of Reichenbach's vindication remains controversial.21 As I have a1-
ready stated, I do not want to enter into a discussion of the criticism. Rather, I wou1d 
like simply to concede the argument-with one qualification-in order to show how 
a claim to rationality can be utilized in establishing the autonomy of a discipline. 
The qualification concerns Reichenbach's exclusive identification ofthe goal of sci-
ence with prognosis. Although one may concede the plausibility ofhis argument that 
the choice of induction in pursuance of this goal is rational, one ought not forget 
that other goals might be incompatible with induction and other means necessary to 
achieve them. To stick with the aforementioned examples, Goethe 's research of nature 
led him to a critique of induction, and the atomistic program of explaining nature led 
to the assumption of non-inductive hypotheses. 
I would like to emphasize three ofthe things that can be leamed from Reichenbach 's 
pragmatic justification of induction and its relation to the context distinction. First, 
Reichenbach is right to emphasize the tremendous significance of induction in the 
natural sciences. Since the Aristotelian beginnings ofscience and oftheoretical reflec-
tion about the methods of science, induction has played a key role in both areas. The 
inductive procedure is among the methods of contemporary science the application 
ofwhich transcend epochal and disciplinary boundaries. The focus on such non-Iocal 
structural patterns in the development of science is more characteristic of the phi-
losophy of science than of the history of science (Radder 1996). Induction being 
among these structural patterns (others would be mathematization and technization), 
the context of justification being the name of an appropriate domain for theoretical 
reflection about these patterns, and the context of discovery being the name of an 
appropriate domain for the presentation of their historical reality, one may say that 
the context distinction reflects a plausible relation between philosophy and history of 
science. 
Secondly, the discussion of induction is not only thematically, but also methodolog-
ically, exemplary of specific characteristics of philosophy of science. This is made 
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clear by the argumentative character of the vindication of induction, upon which 
Reichenbach bases epistemology's claim to justification. According to Reichenbach 
"the justification of a theory in terms of observational data is the subject of the theory 
of induction," which-apart from the rule of induction-avails itself exclusively of 
deductive laws (Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). This claim of justification holds for every 
application ofthe theory ofinduction, whether it be with approximately logical content 
as in the sciences, or with exclusively logical form as in Reichenbach's epistemol-
ogy. But the vindication-in contrast to its object, namely induction-is categorically 
distinct from the scientific justification, since it proceeds not empirically but argumen-
tatively. Thus the vindication of induction establishes the autonomy of epistemology 
even if an epistemological analysis of science cannot be distinguished sharply from 
the inductive procedure ofthe sciences, as in the earlier ofthe aforementioned phases 
of the context distinction. Argumentative justifications are typical of philosophy and 
still constitute a criterion for distinguishing philosophy from science studies. 
Thirdly, in addition to distinguishing philosophy form other disciplines, the vindi-
cation yields an inner-philosophical distinction as weIl. Its object differs for example 
from all non-inductive procedures, such as Popper's deductive falsificationism. Its 
pragmatic character distinguishes it from Carnap 's attempt to meet Hume 's challenge 
with a new concept oftheoretica1 rationality (Schramm 1993, pp. 548-553). 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I set out to look for arguments to account for the relevance ofReichenbach 's distinction 
between a context of discovery and a context ofjustification upon the establishment of 
the autonomy ofphi10sophy ofscience (whichhe calls epistemology). The autonomy 
of this discipline is problematic for Reichenbach because of its close relationship 
to the practice and theory of science. lustification is conceived of in his writings as 
essentially inductive and as a topic for the sciences and epistemology. The epistemo-
logical justification differs from the scientific one only in that it is limited to logical 
form. It remains unclear why the sciences should not also be competent to carry out 
a pure1y 10gical analysis oftheir inductive methods ofinference. 
According to Reichenbach, it is more typical for the sciences than for epistemology 
to aim for discoveries. In his writings it remains an open question to what extent the 
processes of scientific discovery are inductive and hence a potential object of inquiry 
within the context of (scientific or epistemological) justification. In part, he seems 
not to want to exclude the possibility of future processes of discovery employing a 
strictly inductive logic, which would then dissolve the context distinction. But as for 
discoveries made up to the present, he assumes for the most part that they arise from 
circumstances as yet not uniformly characterized. Induction, on the other hand, is for 
Reichenbach a method generally characteristic of the sciences and of the justification 
oftheories. 
In Reichenbach's view, epistemology stands in danger ofbeing dissolved into the 
sciences. But his context distinction is no merely verbal, last-ditch attempt at dis-
tinguishing epistemology. Reichenbach characterizes epistemology by appealing to 
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the fact that it thematizes general characteristics of science. Although philosophy 
of science has long since stopped limiting itself to the logical analysis of scientific 
methods, this is still an aspect-alongside its focus on contemporary problems-
which distinguishes it from most research in the history of science. Reichenbach's 
justification of induction demonstrates paradigmatically how philosophy employs its 
own method-essentially argumentative in nature--outside the domain in which it 
seeks to justify the knowledge produced in other disciplines. This vindication be-
longs alongside Pascal's wager in the tradition ofpragmatic arguments. Analyzing it 
reveals that Reichenbach 's one-sided focus on the prognostic goals of science and on 
the inductive method does not entail the exclusion of discoveries from the context 
ofjustification. Rather, it impugns the claim to validity ofnon-inductive procedures 
taken to be pre-requisites to the formulation oftheories. 
If one drops the claim to exclusivity with which Reichenbach invests his vindi-
cation, one can learn from his procedure that the foundation of the autonomy of a 
discipline can emerge from a justification that ascribes rationality to the methods of 
that discipline. Reichenbach was right in viewing methodological rationality as de-
pendant upon the goals attributed to a given domain of research, yet he overlooked 
the plurality of such goals. 
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NOTES 
I. The literature concerning the debate between philosophy and history of science is extensive. For an 
overview see Laudan 1990; HuH et al. (eds.), 1992; Nickles 1995. For more recent publications, see 
for example Radder 1997; Pinnick and Gale 2000; Burian and Steinie 2002. 
2. Reichenbach 's motivations in formulating the context distinction are discussed in Zittlau 1981, 44; 
Nickles 2002; Stadler 2002; Howard 2004; Howard, this volume. 
3. Concerning the reception ofthe context distinction generally, i.e. insofar as it cannot be attributed 
exclusively to Reichenbach, see Hoyningen-Huene 1987; for the reception ofReichenbach's version 
of it Schiemann 2003, p. 237. In connection with the treatment ofReichenbach's theory of induction, 
there is some discussion ofthe context distinction in Salmon 1991; KeHy 1991. As for Reichenbach 's 
theory of induction, see also Clendinnen 1979; Schramm 1993. 
4. Concerning the debate about Reichenbach 's justification of the theory of induction, see Clendinnen 
1979; Schramm 1993; Kamlah 1994,545-549; Gerner 1997,165 et seq. More recently Piller 1987; 
Schurz 1988. 
5. This version corresponds most nearly to the fourth version characterized by Hoyningen-Huene (this 
volume ), although Reichenbach counts the natural sciences among those empirical disciplines from 
which epistemology is distinct. 
6. In another passage, Reichenbach explains "the division of labour between the physicist and the 
philosopher" by referring to the "limitation of human capacities": "It appears to be practically 
impossible that the man who is looking for new physical laws should also concentrate on the 
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analysis of his method". Moreover, there is a difference in the mentalities of the two groups of 
people: "The discovery of general relations [ ... ] requires a mentality different from that of the 
philosopher, whose methods are analytic and critical rather than predictive" (Reichenbach 1949b, 
p.292). 
7. Cf. Howard's and Richardson's discussions in this volume. 
8. The definition ofprobability based on frequency is, for example, by no means the only alternative; 
and the reduction of causality to inductive relations of probability is also controversial. 
9. Maria Reichenbach and Herrnann Vetter translate "super- and supporting structure" with "Unter-
und Überbau" (Reichenbach 1983, p. 253). 
10. Referring to Galileo he constrains himse1f to the formulation "he found that the quantities measured 
fit into the formula s = gF/2, and inferred, by means of the inductive principle, that the same law 
holds for similar cases" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 371). Of Darwin he only writes: when "Darwin 
formulated [his] theory, it was based on facts" (Reichenbach 1938, p. 390). And as for Einstein, he 
remarks merely that he "saw-as his predecessors had not seen-that the known facts indicate such 
a theory; i.e., that an inductive expansion of known facts leads to the new theory" (Reichenbach 
1938, p. 382). 
11. Reichenbach does not consistently assert the rationalizability of discoveries throughout his early 
writings: "the procedure of discovery is however hardly rationalizable" (Reichenbach 1935a, 
p.I72). 
12. On other occasions Reichenbach states more explicitly that he does not even believe scien-
tists who e1aim to have arrived at their theories by non-inductive means: (Reichenbach 1935b, 
pp. 281-282). 
13. Some interpreters claim that Reichenbach does not justif)r the distinction in "Experience and Pre-
diction" (Giere 1999, p. 228; Kelly 1991, pp. 13 7-140). Since later discussions of the distinction do 
not repeat the justification, Kelly speaks of a "dogma" (Kelly 1991, p. 139). This characterization 
is inaccurate, though, considering that Reichenbach attempted to justif)r the distinction not only 
directly upon introducing it but also in the context ofhis work. 
14. In Reichenbach 1949b, the "challenge of developing rules for a 10gic of discovery" is not sharply 
distinguished from logical analysis: the "philosopher of science is not much interested in the thought 
processes which lead to scientific discoveries" (Reichenbach 1949b, p. 292). 
15. This meaning matches up with Hoyningen-Huene's Version 1 (this volume). 
16. He made the first announcement ofhis "illumination of the induction problem" in a letter to Moritz 
Schlick dated February 22, 1933 (Kamlah 1994, p. 546). There is an anecdote that Reichenbach 
proclaimed as the Nazis e10sed the Berlin University: "Now I understand the induction problem" 
(Giere 1999, p. 226). 
17. Giere 1996 assumes that Reichenbach applies the context distinction in order to establish induction 
as a topic for Logical Empiricism. However, Howard 2004b, p. 23, points out that the context 
distinction received critically among American Pragmatists. 
18. Pascal 1984, Fragm. 233. On the structure ofPascal's wager, cf. Hacking 1975, pp. 63-72; Jordan 
1994. On the similarity between Reichenbach 's pragrnatic justification and Pascal's wager see Creed 
1939; Salmon 1991; Gerner 1997; Schramm 1999; Kamlah 1977, p. 479 draws attention to a 
difference. 
19. Reichenbach 1933; Hertz 1936; Reichenbach 1936; Reichenbach 1949a, pp. 469-482; Reichenbach 
1938, pp. 348-357; Salmon 1991, p. 100; see also literature ofFootnote 4. 
20. In 1939, Reichenbach referred explicitly to the e10se systematic relationship between the prag-
matic character of his justification of induction and the work of American pragrnatists Dewey and 
Peirce on the induction problem (Reichenbach 1939, pp. 187-190). It cannot be ruled out that he 
may have been chosen to work on the issue of induction, and also proposed a pragmatic justifi-
cation of the rule of induction, with a mind to improving his chances for a professorship in the 
USo In doing so, Reichenbach distanced himself from the typically Kantian transcendental justifi-
cation, which he himself developed in his dissertation on the re1ated problem of probability. The 
pragrnatic and the transcendental justifications share only the general demand for "a necessary 
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condition" ofknowledge in common (Reichenbach 1936. cf. KamIah 1977, pp. 476-480; Kamlah 
1989, pp. 443-447; Richardson, this volume). 
21. Cf. Footnote 4. 
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